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From the 1970s a series of constitutional reforms progressively transformed the Belgian unitary state into a federal one: today, indeed, the first article of the Belgian constitution stipulates that ‘Belgium is a federal state made up of Communities and Regions’. As the result of federal reforms, each community and region has developed a substantially different political culture: the profile of key political players, the parties in power themselves and the issues which divide them, the political alliance they formed, all have evolved in different directions. It is not surprising, then, that the place of extreme-right parties, their profiles and discourse on the Belgian political stage vary greatly depending on whether one is analysing the Dutch-speaking Flemish region in the north of the country, the bilingual Brussels Capital region or the French-speaking Walloon region in the south​[2]​. 





Along with the concepts of fascism and populism, the concept of the extreme-right suffers from acute notional fuzziness; for this reason, it is without doubt a concept for which there is no academic consensus in terms of definition (Backes, 2004). 

In this ideology, we need first to highlight the importance of the observed inequality between people, ‘races’ and cultures. The belief of inequality is a fundamental axiom of extreme-right ideology. This belief justifies nationalism as a political project, this is the second characteristic. The extreme-right’s views are built around a strong and passionate idea of the nation. As a State, according to extreme-right thinking, the nation must bring together (within a territory) individuals with supposedly common cultural and ‘biological’ origins; these origins make these individuals ‘racially’ superior beings (relative to foreigners and immigrants). Furthermore, the reason the extreme-right encourages racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism – all strategies to fight against the enemies of the homogeneous, white people – is to ensure the purity and homogeneity of the national group. Third characteristic, to the observed inequality between people, 'races' and cultures, and to the nationalism, we may add radicalism as an attitude which aims to act on the root (radix) – the profound cause – of the phenomenon one is seeking to affect. Radicalism represents a type of ‘absolute’ action, a ‘total’ way of acting to give shape to nationalism. 

The extreme-right in French-speaking Belgium

Strictly speaking, there have not been any violent, organised and active extreme-right groupings in French-speaking Belgium since the end of the 1980s. The lack of racial violence and the poor electoral results of the extreme-right in Wallonia and Brussels undoubtedly explain why the extreme-right does not have the same academic and political interest in these regions as in their northern neighbour or in France.

As well as poor electoral results and the lack of attention they generate, there is also the fundamentally changing and almost enigmatic nature of the French-speaking extreme-right. With each new election, quarrel between individuals, doctrinal divergence and condemnation of elected representatives for racism, the French-speaking extreme-right has become – if it has not always been – very difficult to describe and analyse in Wallonia and Brussels. 

Based on the criteria set out above, the following may be considered to be extreme-right parties: the Front National (‘National Front’ – FN), formed in 1985 and led by its once ‘lifetime president’ Daniel Féret until 2008​[3]​, the Front Nouveau de Belgique (‘New Belgian Front’ – FNB), a breakaway from the FN formed in 1996 by Marguerite Bastien, and (Flemish) Vlaams Belang​[4]​, which courts French-speaking voters in Brussels and the Hainaut region. The FN, FNB and VB have secured, in varying proportions and geographical areas, a relatively large electoral and media audience relative to other competing parties and small groups at the extreme-right of the political spectrum. With the exception of Agir, an extremist Walloon party formed in Liège in 1989 which experienced electoral success in 1994 before imploding shortly afterwards, the rest of the extreme-right now consists only of numerous small parties which are of no great interest to this discussion and are often unknown outside such and such a district of Liège, Brussels or Charleroi: the Parti social-démocrate (PSD), Intérêts citoyens Bruxelles (ICB), the Bloc Wallonie Libre (Bloc WL), Référendum (REF), etc. (Blaise, 2004 : 152-155).

Leadership feuds, fratricidal battles, ideological and doctrinal disagreements, opportunism and a lack of charisma and leadership mean the FN, FNB and miscellaneous other small groups make up a French-speaking extreme-right that has no framework, no projects, no organisation and, if not vacuous, no coherent programme. It is also an extreme-right that has no real electorate with the exception of the FN, ‘An electorate with no party’ (Alaluf, 1998: 115). Among other reasons, and mainly because of its famous acronym which reminds its powerful French counterpart (led by Jean-Marie Le Pen since 1972), Belgian FN has for the last ten years, and more specifically since the June 2004 regional elections, managed to stand out a little from the crowd. For this reason, we shall focus specific attention on Daniel Féret’s Front National in terms of literature and understanding. 

From 1995 to 2004, the French-speaking extreme-right was electorally weak. Indeed, in purely electoral terms, ‘it experienced a significant downturn in the 1995 legislative elections and the 2000 local elections, followed by a sharp surge in the 2003 federal elections, despite its near-total absence from the electoral campaign’ (Blaise, 2004 : 174). While all extreme-right parties suffered more or less the same electoral rejection from 1995 to 2003, it was obviously the weakest and most fragile parties and groups that would not be able to survive this ‘journey through the desert’. With Agir imploding shortly after its 1994 electoral success, Daniel Féret’s Front National has become the only extreme-right party in French-speaking Belgium not to have been a splinter group, a defunct party or an empty shell. ‘Within this shifting landscape of fragmented groups, (...) since the end of the 1980s Daniel Féret’s Front National has constituted the leading figurehead of the French-speaking extreme-right’, affirmed Alaluf (1998 : 101). 

Last figures from local, regional and national elections in 2004 and 2007 confirm the FN as the main extreme-right party in southern Belgium. With more than 8 % at regional level in 2004, and between 5 and 8 % at the national (national senate and house) level in some districts such as Liège (4.51), Hainaut (7.87) or Namur (4.97) in 2007 (Service public fédéral de l'Intérieur, 2009), FN stays the main radical actor in southern Belgium. 

The Front National’s programme

Since the party’s creation in 1985, the Front National’s programme has been a deliberate – and confirmed as such – copy of the French Front National’s programme. Among other things, one may read in Article 4 of the statutes of the FN non-profit-making association, created in September 1985, that the party’s purpose is ‘to favour the dissemination of the arguments, opinions and publications of the French Front National political party’(quoted by Rea, 1995 : 38). As Art explains, ‘Féret made no attempt to hide the fact that he was copying the Front national of Jean-Marie Le Pen, taking the French party’s name along with many of its symbols and slogans’ (Art, 2008 : 430).

Indeed, at the time it was never a matter of copying only the initials or name of a party; it was also a matter of creating within a united Belgium a party equivalent to the French FN. This new party, according to Alain Sadaune (Walloon FN Member of Parliament) in La Flamme (December 1995), would be able to ‘protect’ the Belgian nation and its white population not only against immigration and ‘its disastrous consequences’ in terms of security and employment, but also against ‘those traitors who are opening the gates of our beautiful, peace-loving country to the barbarian hordes who come to pillage the land of our ancestors and our grandchildren’s inheritance’ (quoted by Abramowicz, 1996 : 45).

Most authors who have tried to analyse the doctrinal content of the Belgian FN’s programme agree that the various versions published since 1985 have lacked precision and consistency (Alaluf, 1995 and 1998; Delwit and De Waele : 1998; Rea, 1995 and 1996). However, it is possible to highlight three areas or points of policy which contain a minimum amount of content and development, and which on this basis enable us to gain a better understanding of the ideological nature of the FN. These subjects are immigration; security; the state of the Belgian economy (including taxation and employment policies). By developing these three points, we will also be able to infer other aspects of the Front National’s programme.

From the outset, according to Rea (1996: 197), ‘the FN has made the fight against immigration a policy priority and the sole answer to two social problems: the fight against social abuses and against insecurity, in the name of a political imperative – defence of the national identity’. While anti-Semitism and revisionism are not lacking in the FN's arguments and policy themes, the author goes to great lengths to show that xenophobia and racism against (non-European) immigrants appear by far to be the party's priority. Rea adds that two solutions are put forward to meet these challenges: ‘repatriation of non-European immigrants and national preference’, a simple and effective way, for the FN, of reducing unemployment, the costs of poverty, local community costs and insecurity (Rea, 1996: 197).

The FN’s different policy treatment of immigrants according to whether or not they are of European origin in particular, its obsession against non-European immigrants from the Third World  and  ‘Muslim fanatics’ has already been noted (Brewaeys, Dahaut and Tolbiac, 1992: 27 and 28). Since then, various works have shown that foreigners from France, Germany or Italy have never been considered by the FN in the same way as non-European foreigners. Abramowicz notes that, on reading the extreme-right’s arguments, ‘[and] in contrast to the Italians, the Spanish, etc., it is not possible to integrate extra-European foreigners due to their differing culture, religion and history, and also because there are “too many of them”’ (Abramowicz, 1996: 46 - 47). In general terms, the literature highlights that the FN’s rejection of foreigners is even stronger when they come from Africa and/or a Muslim country.

Alongside immigration, security constitutes the second pillar – the second concrete doctrinal element – of the Belgian Front National’s programme. While for the last few years security as a point of policy has not been unique to the extreme-right (many traditional parties have picked up this electorally promising theme), the relationship between immigration and insecurity still remains an indisputable trademark of the latter. The fight against insecurity is ‘always associated (within the FN) with immigration, thus maintaining the deliberate confusion between delinquency and immigration’ (Rea, 1996: 197). From 1985 onwards, supported by dubious statistics and unproven causal links, the FN has been the main political party in Post-war-French-speaking Belgium to systematically establish a link between immigration on the one hand, and insecurity, delinquency, criminality, prostitution and drug trafficking on the other.

The literature contains numerous examples of stigmatisation and demonisation by the FN. On each occasion, ‘various sources are used to establish a relationship between immigration and insecurity’ and particularly to talk about the ‘Lebanonisation of our country’ faced with the young people's revolt at Forest in May 1991, or to affirm that ‘it is no coincidence that the eight high-risk municipal districts (of Brussels) are those with the highest concentration of immigrants’ (Rea, 1995 : 44-45). The 1991 riots happened in poor boroughs and have been analysed as a claim for social and political recognition by young migrants (Rea, 2002). 

The denunciation of 'communautarisme' by the Belgian FN is made within the context of a specific understanding of integration which is inspired by the French republican model. Here again, the Belgian FN follows the French FN when it says the French republican model is 'under attack'. In light of the above, it is not surprising to learn that the FN proposes application of the death penalty for terrorists and criminals, emergency repatriation of criminal delinquents, ‘de-naturalisation’ of immigrant delinquents and improved status for the police (Rea, 1995 :198). The FN explains unambiguously how it intends to restore internal security: ‘We're not ashamed to say that we prefer policemen to hooligans, young people to drug dealers and victims to murderers’ (quoted by Brewaeys, Dahaut and Tolbiac, 1992: 28).

The FN also devotes a substantial part of its programme to socio-economic issues, including taxation policy and the fight against unemployment. In two contributions to collective works on the extreme-right (1995 and 1998), Alaluf focuses more specifically on the Front National's socio-economic programme, where he nevertheless points out up front that, while the latter long remained embryonic, poor and vague, it has finally gained a little more importance as elections have proceeded (1998 : 102). With respect to employment, Alaluf thus explains that for the FN, ‘it is the repatriation of immigrants that will free up jobs for Belgians and Europeans to whom priority will have been restored’ (1998 : 103). Via full employment, this approach will enable income tax to be reduced, a parental salary to be established for those wishing to have children and take time to look after them, policemen and prison guards to be better paid, etc.

In social terms, it is the inversion of migratory flows that will enable immigrants to be sent back to their own countries and budgets intended for their integration to be used for ‘destitute compatriots only’. On this subject, the FN's programme explains that detention centres for ‘illegal’ foreigners will make decent homes for poor Belgians. The inversion of migratory flows will also serve to put an end to unfair competition for Belgian workers from foreigners working illegally. Finally, explains Alaluf, the FN proposes to split social security in two by creating a special, separate fund for immigrants. Taken together, the above proposals will solve the major problems of poverty, exclusion and unemployment in Belgium.

Finally, with respect to taxation, the FN’s programme advocates a kind of ultra-liberalist protectionism, proposing to reduce taxes and free up the economy at the same time as protecting Belgian businesses against unfair competition from non-European countries. This supports Rea’s contention that the FN’s social and economic programme ‘reflects the party’s two ideological influences, one national-populist and the other liberalist’ (Rea, 1996: 198).

A deep analysis of the last version of the Front national's programme (April 3, 2008) do not show a significant evolution in terms of content. If the socio-economic issues haven't changed through the years, some changes need to be highlighted in the field of migration in relation with the Muslim population in Belgium. Immigration appears in the 2008 programme through the ‘Islamic threat’. Uncontrolled immigration, ‘failed integration’, ‘fake refugees’, ‘foreign influences’ and ‘communautarismes’ from the old political platform are exposed in the last version mainly through the Islamic threat, the Qur'an, polygamy and others denunciations of an ‘Islamic invasion’. 

As the FN and its members have been sued for racist rhetoric by NGOs or public institutions struggling against racism, the programme also proposes to change the law in this field (Programme of the Front national, 2008). The FN argues this law goes against the principle of freedom of speech.

The Front national and the extreme-right designation

We have seen in the beginning of this article that the inequality between people and races, nationalism and radicalism were, among others, three useful qualities to identify the ideology of the extreme-right.

The inequality between races and cultures appears implicitly in the so-called incapacity of migrants from Muslim countries to integrate in Belgium. If the inequality is not described clearly, the association between migrants, Islam, fundamentalism and terrorism reveals such a vision. In terms of nationalism, a passionate view of the nation and the sacred status of the white people are seen in all the FN’s provisions aiming to reverse migratory flows in order to save the ‘racially superior’ Belgian people and protect its ‘ancestral’ culture. 

Racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism – both as a reaction to and as a strategy against the enemies of the people – form an integral part of the FN’s programme, publications and flyers, which are crammed full of caricatures, insults and attacks on immigrants, and more specifically those of African origin (from Third World and Muslim countries). As forms of radical attitudes and behaviours, racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism rely on the principle of inequality and the need to protect the nation. 

As another form of radicalism, the desire to establish an authoritarian regime of ‘absolute law and order’ appears in all the FN’s provisions aiming to improve the status of the police by increasing salaries and giving more power to certain bodies, proposing reintroduction of the death penalty, etc.

The extreme-right in Dutch-speaking Belgium

In northern Belgium, the Flemish movement is often linked to the Flemish nationalism which is also often linked to extreme-right (De Witte and Spruyt, 2004 : 127). It is necessary to establish differences between the three. The Flemish movement seeks social, cultural and economic emancipation, it is a pluralist action which gathers all trends in the Flemish society. Flemish nationalism is a political trend within the Flemish movement which seeks to protect Flemish interest through political actions. This trend is pluralist and includes different actors, programmes and aims. Finally, the extreme-right has been historically linked to the Flemish nationalism even if the latter cannot be reduced to this specific political ideology (De Witte and Spruyt, 2004 :217). As Art explains, in Flanders, ‘the postwar far right was incorporated into a mainstream nationalist movement that dates back over a century’ (Art, 2008 : 421).





While French-speaking Belgium’s Front National openly draws its inspiration from the French Front National, the situation is very different with respect to Vlaams Belang, whose nationalism differs radically from that of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s party. Studied by De Witte and Scheepers, VB’s ideology ‘gives priority to the conception of a nationalist organisation of the State, which views the people as an ethnic “community” with hereditary links’. In this way, ‘the concept of nationality is founded on “biological consanguinity”’ and ‘since the structure of the State must follow the “natural ethnic structure”, (the party) opts for an organically and hierarchically ordered Flanders’. De Witte and Scheepers conclude that the emphasis placed on ‘a State organisation founded on ethnic nationalism also implies that the State must be monocultural and monoracial’ (De Witte and Scheepers, 1998 : 100-101). This analysis is regularly illustrated by the comments of VB's main leaders, including those of former party leader Filip Dewinter: ‘If we want an independent Flanders, we must ignore the laws of Belgium. I remain convinced that democracy is only possible in the context of homogeneous ethnic Communities. There is no democracy in Belgium’ (Dewinter, 1995).

Ethnicity is perceived by Vlaams Belang as a blend of cultural, racial, linguistic and identity traits that point to both biological inequality between ethnic groups and nationalism as a method of protecting the superior ethnic group. This fact enabled De Witte and Scheepers to define the difference between ethnic nationalism and State nationalism by presenting the Flemish extreme-right party’s programme on two levels. The first level concerns the Flemish people, which ‘is an ethnic community with hereditary links’ united by ‘biological consanguinity’. The Flemish people is driven by ‘a natural ethnic structure’ which requires each member of the community to found a large family, favour monogamous marriage and categorically reject other types of relationship (De Witte and Scheepers, 1998: 103). Within Vlaams Belang’s discourse, national interests are more important than individual interests, and everyone must submit to ‘the organic whole’. 

The second level concerns the structure of the State, which exists to support the ‘natural, ethnic structure’. The State is nationalist in order to protect the Flemish ethnic group; it advocates an independent Flanders, rejects immigrants who threaten the integrity and homogeneity of the biological social body and condemns ‘the political mafia’ and traditional parties who favour immigration and corruption. Statist nationalism puts the State above all other considerations; ethnic nationalism favours ethnic groups, irrespective of the State’s borders and potential changes to them. 

Most authors who have tried to analyse the doctrinal content of the French-speaking Belgian FN’s programme agree that the various versions published since 1985 have lacked precision and consistency. It is, however, much easier to highlight the fundamental policy points that lie behind Vlaams Belang’s discourse. These include opposition to immigration, an attachment to the idea of hierarchy in society, recognition of inequalities between ‘races’, peoples and cultures and the need to set up a system of segregation. These points have multiple consequences, particularly in relation to VB's conception of work and the place of workers in Flemish society.

On reading the party's flyers and electoral programme, it is clear that what concerns Filip Dewinter is not so much foreigners from Eastern Europe but immigration from Africa and the Maghreb, or what is referred to in Belang jargon as ‘Muslim’ immigration. This immigration threatens the cultural and ‘racial’ integrity of the Flemish people by introducing into Flanders individuals who are foreigners, refugees, fundamentalists and potential terrorists. The leaders of Vlaams Belang have spoken out very clearly on this subject: ‘Only prostitutes leave their doors wide open. We have no wish to turn Flanders into a public brothel open to all the foreigners of Africa and Asia’. In a country with 400,000 unemployed, as they have often explained, ‘it is irresponsible to maintain a small army of unemployed foreigners’, since immigrants ‘come to our country to take advantage of our social benefits’​[5]​. Vlaams Belang’s programme in relation to immigration and receiving foreigners contains multiple attacks on the European Convention on Human Rights. Its discourse sets out extreme measures against immigrants and challenges some of the fundamental rights of foreigners. Thus, ‘freedom of association must be restricted for foreigners, as must the right to family reunification’, the right to ownership and to (racial) non-discrimination. The programme proposes ‘separate education and social security systems’ for foreigners, restrictions on the right to family allowances and the right to collect unemployment benefit, as well as taxes on companies which hire foreigners, etc. (Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2001: 15). 

The extreme-right’s discourse is also built on the fundamental postulate of racial and biological inequality between peoples. This is the inescapable starting point for encouraging a strong, passionate idea of the nation, and the essential principle justifying the coming together within a given territory of individuals with supposedly common cultural and ‘biological’ origins – origins which make the latter ‘racially’ superior beings within a natural, ancestral hierarchy. The Flemish Vlaams Belang fits into this conception of the world, making use of a highly developed ethnic, cultural and racial hierarchy (Van Craen (​mailto:​) and Swyngedouw (​mailto:​), 2003). Within its propaganda, the Flemish sit at the top of the racial pyramid, followed by the Dutch, the white Afrikaners of South Africa (VB long gave its unconditional support to the South African apartheid regime), then the gallicised Flemish of Brussels, Wallonia and French Flanders, who are inferior but nevertheless share some traits with the Flemish. Foreigners of European origin are next on the hierarchical list, above foreigners of non-European origin, who no longer have any relationship to the Flemish people and are at the very bottom of the pyramid.

Adamson and Johns have for their part established a list of ‘negative “others” who might complete with new examples the hierarchy and the pyramid. Those "others" are to be contrasted with, and indeed set in direct opposition to, the nation’ in the VB ideology. Among the ‘negative others’ , they talk about Belgium, Wallonia, the European Union, bureaucracy and bureaucrats, the ‘political establishment’, and immigrants (Adamson and Johns, 2008 : 137). 

The hierarchy above and the list of ‘others’ point to the idea of inequality. According to Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, within Vlaams Belang it is felt that ‘egalitarianism is fundamentally wrong and goes against the laws of nature’ (Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2003: 6). Inequality justifies the unequal distribution of wealth, and it is within this context that the slogan ‘our people first’ and the principle of national preference take on their full importance. This principle illustrates both the centrality of inequality within extreme-right discourse and the consequences of such discourse on individuals’ and groups’ access to rights and redistribution within the extremists’ programme. The principle of national preference firstly affirms as a fundamental postulate the normative principle, considered as positive, of inequality between individuals and human groups; it replaces the rejection of others with a preference for oneself (the right to be different); it postulates, and presents as legitimate, access to fundamental rights and the redistribution of wealth according to ethnic, cultural or racial criteria.

In terms of the economy, Swyngedouw and Ivaldi showed that the idea of ‘working humanity’ was fundamental to Vlaams Belang and its representation of humanity. For the extreme-right, they explain, ‘there is neither the right to be lazy nor homo ludens. Service is an obligation determined by each individual’s position or role within the natural community. Rights may only be obtained through productive work, and individuals need to be trained primarily on the basis of a feeling of responsibility towards the community’ (Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2001: 6).

‘The lack of a right to be lazy’, which lies at the heart of Vlaams Belang’s discourse, takes on particular significance when one recalls the reform of the Belgian State and the sharing of power and the multiple competences of the former unitary Government along a linguistic and cultural axis on the one hand and a more specifically economic axis on the other hand. Indeed, while the linguistic and cultural axis has been an unprecedented opportunity for Vlaams Belang to disseminate its message and take up the Flemish nationalist separatist discourse, the social and economic axis has also enabled the party’s leaders to praise workers in the north of the country ruined by the lazy Walloons in the south, thus opposing Belgian citizens on a social and economic basis (jobs, unemployment, benefits, etc.). For Filip Dewinter, the wealth of ‘his’ people is under threat not so much from the traditional Flemish parties as from the corrupt Belgian federal State. Within Belang rhetoric, the Flemish people is threatened by all the various socialist Walloons, communists and leftists who run the country and distribute wealth to Muslims and foreigners (for their mosques) and to the unemployed, lazy, decadent, inactive Walloons. For Vlaams Belang’s former leader, ‘It would be unthinkable for the Stalinist socialist party to lay down the law to Flanders. Or for him (Elio Di Rupo) to continue stealing the Flemish billions. Let’s be clear about this: it is we, the Flemish, who keep the Walloons alive’ (quoted in Le Soir, 2004). 

Vlaams Belang and French-speaking Brussels

In terms of ideology, targeted research into the place of Islam and Muslims within Vlaams Belang’s French language publications between 2000 and 2004 (Alves Dos Santos, 2004) reveals an increasingly systematic hounding of the Arab-Islamic community by Vlaams Belang. Drawing on a systematic dissection and analysis of the content of “Vérités Bruxelloises”, Vlaams Belang’s French language magazine edited by Johan Demol (former chief commissioner of the Schaerbeek police), Alves Dos Santos was able to show the extent to which Islam and Muslims were systematically likened to unemployed, profiteering delinquents at best, and to religious fanatics and terrorist criminals at worst. Relative to other minorities and categories of foreigners, ‘Arab-Islamics’ seem to be the monopoly target for stigmatisation and demonisation within Vlaams Belang’s discourse: ‘Throughout four years of Vlaams Belang publications, the recurrence of attacks against Islam is quite blatant. There is not a single publication that fails to take up this theme. Yesterday it was immigrants who were coming to steal jobs from the Belgians; today it is Muslims’ (Alves Dos Santos, 2004: 99).

Recent data from the Vlaams Belang website show the persistence of the ‘Muslim threat’. Nevertheless, if the VB has a specific speech about Muslims at the attention of French-speaking voters, articles from the VB at the attention of Flemish voters in Brussels reveal some differences. As an example, an issue of The Flemish Republic explains in 2008 that ‘half of the Brussels population (…) is no longer Belgian but foreign. Many are Europeans, others are Muslims of North African or Turkish origin, who also prefer French to Dutch. (…). The islamification of Brussels is driving many Belgians out of the city’ (The Flemish Republic, 2008, 2). Since the article is written at the attention of Flemish voters, the threat is now double. First there is the islamification of Brussels, second, Muslims vote for French parties and no for Flemish parties. So Brussels might become a French-speaking Muslim city.

The Vlaams Belang and the extreme-right designation

‘The Vlaams Belang will remain what it is : a Flemish-nationalist party defending family values and morality, standing for sound economic principles and for the introduction of a direct democracy in an independent and free Flanders’ (The Flemish Republic, 2008, 3). If this quote from the new chairman of the Vlaams Belang, Bruno Valkeniers, sounds like a support for democratic practices, at an ideological level, the links between Vlaams Belang and the extreme-right are very strong. 

Firstly, this can be seen historically in the careers of VB representatives, who often pass through the VMO private militia (Vlaamse militanten orde), the Voorpost and the NSV (respectively a paramilitary organisation created in 1976 and now serving Vlaams Belang and an extreme-right-wing students’ union), and even through pro-Nazi organisations during the Second World War or gatherings of former collaborators after the war. Among others, as an example, the founder of the Vlaams Blok, Karel Dillen, openly supported the Nazi invasion in 1940. Two quotes illustrate that opinion. About the invasion, Dillen said ‘For us, it is like if vacations started too early’. About the German occupation, Dillen said: ‘I say it frankly: during the war, I was a strong supporter of what we called l'Ordre nouveau’ (New Order), because I hoped that the emancipation of Flanders was about to be finally a reality" (quoted by Gijsels, 1993: 206). Dillen who died in 2007 is still an important symbol for the Vlaams Belang as several articles have been written about him and his career in the VB press. 

Secondly, it can be seen programmatically through the party's proposals. It aimed at making possible an amnesty for former collaborators, it looks for an ethnically pure, independent Flanders (Flemish and white) and it supports the rejection of immigration. It is also clearly visible through its praise for inequality between races, peoples and cultures and its repeated attacks on foreigners, who are held responsible for criminality and insecurity. Within Vlaams Belang’s Brussels propaganda, stigmatised foreigners have gradually given way to immigrants from Muslim countries, and subsequently to ‘Arabs’ in a very general sense (De Witte and Spruyt, 2004: 130-134).

Today, because of the permanent threat of a conviction for racism, the Vlaams Belang representatives have deeply changed the words they are using to oppose foreigners from ‘invading’ Flanders (Erk, 2005). As an example, in the section ‘Identity’, the current manifesto of the VB only talk about ‘reversing the erroneous Multicultural Policies’: ‘Inspired by its concern to defend and protect the cultural identity of the Flemish people, the Vlaams Belang rejects the tenets of the multicultural ideology’.





What are the common points and the differences between the Front national and the Vlaams Belang in terms of ideologies and speeches today.

The ethno-nationalist dimension of the Vlaams Belang rhetoric is the most important difference in comparison with its French-speaking counterpart. As its introduction explains, the FN Manifesto promote unitarism: ‘We, men and women, belong to the same nation, we share habits and customs, a very close way of thinking and the same essential values. We have a common heritage, we share Greek and Latin but also German culture’ (FN Manifesto, 2008). While the VB holds its programme against ‘unemployed lazy Walloons’ from the South, the FN manifesto do not oppose the social and economic situation of the two sides of Belgium on an ethnic base.

The ethno-nationalist dimension of the Vlaams Belang rhetoric leads to two different ways to criticize the Muslim threat. The VB sees Islam as a threat against its own quest for an ethnic Flemish homogeneity. The FN sees Islam as a threat within the context of a specific understanding of integration which is inspired by the French republican model. This model is supposed to integrate foreigners from all origins and the FN believes there is a specific incapacity for Muslims to integrate, mainly because of so-called requirements in the Qur'an.

Next to those differences, many characteristics are similar in both speeches. First, several of the VB and the FN representatives have been sued for racist rhetoric within the context of the 1981 Act. As a consequence, both parties have changed their rhetoric through years (Erk, 2005). Today the parties oppose less against ‘races’ and nationalities than against the ‘multicultural society’ and religion (mainly Islam). This change let them bypass the law. Both parties are also asking openly the abolition of the 1981 Act in the name of freedom of speech.

Second, neither the VB nor the FN still produce anti-Semitic rhetoric anymore. As seen before, the VB has been founded by Karen Dillen who has been defending negationist remarks on the Holocaust, different actors have been supporting such remarks through different papers and organization close to the VB (Gijsels, 1993 : 182-192). The situation is very different today. The VB develops strategies to attract the Jewish vote in Antwerp and the leaders have clearly said in different circumstances that they were in the side of the Jewish people against the Arab and Muslim threat. As an example, Filip Dewinter, the previous chairman of the VB, gave an interview to the New York based Jewish Week (October 28, 2005) explaining he was not racist but islamophobe. Showing by this way, according to him, how Jewish people and the VB shared the same fear of Islam in both Europe and the United States.

The FN has also changed its rhetoric. From huge supports to the negationist words of Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1987 when Le Pen said he believes the ‘gas chambers were a detail’ of the second world war, the FN is today condemning such words. For example, the FN clearly opposed itself against negationism when those words were repeated by Le Pen at the European Parliament on March 25, 2009. This shift from both the VB and the FN might also be explained by the existence in Belgium of a law voted in 1995 and prohibiting the negation or the minimisation of the Holocaust.
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^2	 	 There is also a German-speaking community located within the territory belonging to the Walloon region in the south. This community is not relevant to this article.
^3	 	 The FN is led today (in April 2009) by Daniel Huygens.
^4	 	 Once named Vlaams Blok, the party became Vlaams Belang in November 2004 within the context of a change of legal status in order to avoid legal charges for racist speeches. We will keep the new name for this article.
^5	 	 Extract from comments by Filip Dewinter at Vlaams Belang’s “Fête de la Famille” (‘Celebration of the Family’) in 1991, in Baas eigen land (April 2000) and at the ‘Confronting the foreign invasion’ organised by Bruxelles-Identité-Sécurité (‘Brussels-Identity-Security’ – BIS) on 2 December 1998 respectively. Based on an assessment by the antifascist centre Résistances : http://www.resistances.be
